Ameriprise Financial Inc (AMP)
UndervaluedFundamental
73
Price
$492.35
Market Cap
$43.86B
Part 1 · What the company is worth
Overview
Ameriprise Financial is a US diversified financial services company built around a large network of financial advisors. Its core business is giving personal financial advice to American retail clients — mostly mass-affluent and affluent households — and then serving them with the brokerage accounts, managed accounts, bank deposits, insurance and annuities that follow from that advice. Alongside the advice business it runs a global asset manager under the Columbia Threadneedle brand, selling funds and investment mandates to retail, high-net-worth and institutional investors, and it manufactures life insurance and annuities. A separate Corporate & Other segment holds closed books of business, including legacy long term care and fixed annuities, that are no longer sold but still carry obligations.
How it makes money
Most of the money comes from fees charged on client assets, so revenue rises and falls with the level of markets and with net client flows. Advisory and management fees on wealth-management and fund assets are the largest block; to these are added distribution fees, commissions and financial-planning fees, net investment income on the company's own invested assets and on bank and certificate balances, and insurance premiums and policy charges from life, disability and annuity contracts. The 10-K states plainly that Asset Management revenues are earned mainly on managed asset balances, which move with markets, net flows, asset allocation and product mix.
Revenue by segment
Financial planning and advice delivered through Ameriprise's advisor network to US retail clients, together with the brokerage accounts, managed accounts, bank products and cash balances that sit behind the advice relationship.
Variable annuities and life and disability insurance manufactured by Ameriprise's insurance subsidiaries and sold largely through its own advisors to retail clients.
Columbia Threadneedle's global investment management business: mutual funds, ETFs and separate accounts sold to retail and high-net-worth investors, and mandates managed for institutional clients.
Closed blocks of business — including legacy long term care and fixed annuities no longer sold — plus investment income on corporate-level assets and excess capital held in subsidiaries.
Competitive moat
Switching costs · NarrowThe durable advantage sits in the advisor relationship rather than in any product. A client who has built a financial plan with one advisor, and holds brokerage, managed accounts, bank deposits, insurance and annuities in the same place, faces real friction in moving — paperwork, tax consequences on transfers, and the cost of rebuilding trust with someone new. That stickiness keeps fee-paying assets in place across market cycles. It is narrow rather than wide: the company itself describes competition as intense, with larger competitors enjoying economies of scale and new technologies changing how advice is delivered, and warns that a drop in investment performance can trigger redemptions and terminated mandates on the asset-management side, where switching is far easier.
What drives demand
Moderately cyclicalDemand for advice itself is fairly steady — people do not stop planning for retirement in a downturn, and advisory relationships tend to persist — but revenue is tied to the market value of client assets, so it falls when markets fall even if no client leaves. The insurance and annuity book adds a slower-moving, less market-sensitive stream, while cash and bank balances make results sensitive to the rate cycle in both directions. The net effect is a business that is less cyclical than a capital-markets or lending franchise, but clearly more so than a consumer staple: the same market decline that reduces fee revenue also makes the guarantees written into annuities more expensive.
Key risks
- Market and interest-rate movements hit both revenues and guarantees — The company discloses that a decline or volatility in equity and bond markets can leave guaranteed minimum benefits worth more than the account values supporting them. Prolonged low rates compress the spread earned on invested assets, potentially to the point of turning negative; rising rates can force higher credited rates on interest-sensitive products, deepen unrealized losses in the investment portfolio, and prompt surrenders and withdrawals that require selling assets at depressed prices.
- Intense competition and scale advantages of larger rivals — Among its business risks the filing names intense competition, new technologies and the economies of scale available to larger competitors as threats to market share and profitability, and adds that the company could experience lower sales, higher costs, talent loss or technology obsolescence.
- Weak investment performance drives outflows — The 10-K states that any drop — or perceived drop — in investment performance relative to competitors could cause a decline in sales of investment products, an increase in redemptions and the termination of asset management relationships, and could also hamper distribution through unaffiliated third parties.
- Attracting and retaining advisors and staff — The company flags that prolonged challenges in attracting and retaining talent, or significant increases in the cost of doing so, could materially affect its financial performance — a direct exposure for a business whose distribution is the advisor network itself.
- Reserve adequacy on long-dated insurance obligations — If reserves for future policy benefits and claims prove inadequate, the company would have to increase them and take income-statement charges in the period of that determination. The filing singles out mortality worse than priced, and persistency that deviates from assumptions: policies that stay in force longer than assumed on long term care, universal life with secondary guarantees and variable annuities with guaranteed withdrawal benefits would require greater benefit payments than projected.
- Reinsurance counterparty default — Ameriprise has ceded significant blocks — including long term care and fixed annuities — to reinsurers. The filing warns that if those counterparties default or fail to perform, the company would be re-exposed to the very risks it sought to transfer, and that a reinsurer's insolvency or unwillingness to pay could have a material adverse effect.
- Reputation, advisor misconduct and conflicts of interest — The filing treats reputation as a risk in its own right: misconduct or errors by employees and advisors could lead to violations of law, regulatory sanctions and serious reputational or financial harm; non-employee franchise advisors control their own technology environments day to day; and failing — or appearing to fail — to address conflicts of interest could invite litigation and enforcement. It also names deepfakes, where AI-altered images, video or audio make it appear that someone said or did something damaging.
- Credit losses and a ratings downgrade — Default-related declines in the fixed maturity portfolio or consumer credit holdings could reduce net earnings and force capital contributions into regulated subsidiaries, and the size of allowances on loans and investments depends on management judgement. Separately, any future downgrade in financial strength ratings — or even the perceived potential for one — could have a significant adverse effect on the business.
Customer concentration
The 10-K does not disclose any customer concentration figure, and does not identify a customer accounting for a material share of revenue. The client base is a large number of US retail households served through the advisor network, plus institutional mandates in the asset-management arm; the filing discusses concentration in terms of investment and counterparty exposures rather than revenue from single clients.
The case for
Buyers argue that the advisor network is the hard part to replicate: once a household has a plan, accounts, deposits and insurance in one place, those assets tend to stay and to pay fees year after year, which turns market appreciation into recurring revenue with little extra cost. They point to a revenue base weighted almost 60% to that wealth-management franchise rather than to the more volatile insurance and asset-management lines, to an asset manager with a global brand in Columbia Threadneedle that can be scaled across the same client base, and to the closed legacy books being progressively reinsured away rather than grown. They also note that the same interest-rate environment that pressures spreads on some products earns income on client cash and bank balances.
The case against
Sellers fear that fee income tied to asset values is leveraged to markets in a way that is outside management's control: a sustained decline takes revenue down immediately while the guarantees embedded in annuities become more expensive at exactly the same moment. They worry about the long-dated insurance obligations — long term care, universal life with secondary guarantees, variable annuities with guaranteed withdrawal benefits — where the company itself warns that mortality or persistency deviating from pricing assumptions would force reserve increases and income-statement charges, and where much of the protection now depends on reinsurers continuing to pay. They also point to the company's own description of intense competition and scale advantages held by larger rivals, to the risk that weaker relative investment performance triggers redemptions and lost mandates, and to the exposure that comes from distribution resting on advisors whose conduct, retention and cost the company does not fully control.
Generated on September 18, 2026 with claude-haiku-4-5 — shared with all users
Direct competitors
Who this company fights with for the same customers
Generated on September 18, 2026 with claude-haiku-4-5 — shared with all users
The largest independent broker-dealer in the United States, competing with Ameriprise for the same affiliated financial advisors and for the mass-affluent household assets those advisors bring with them.
Runs both employee and independent advisor channels serving US retail investors, the same hybrid model and the same client segment as Ameriprise's Advice & Wealth Management business.
Competes for the same retail brokerage and advisory accounts, and its cash-and-advice model pulls in the households Ameriprise wants to serve, often at a lower price point.
A retail-distribution active manager whose mutual funds and ETFs sit on the same advisor platforms and fight for the same investor dollars as Ameriprise's Columbia Threadneedle funds.
Pairs asset management with retirement and annuity products for US savers, overlapping both Columbia Threadneedle and Ameriprise's Retirement & Protection Solutions segment.
Its roughly 19,000 branch-based advisors target the same middle-market and mass-affluent American households that Ameriprise advisors serve, and the two firms recruit advisors directly from each other.
Balance Sheet & Liquidity
Revenue
$19.84B
Trailing 12 months (through 6/30/2026)
Net Income
$3.95B
Trailing 12 months (through 6/30/2026)
Free Cash Flow
$8.16B
Total Equity
$6.55B
Total Liabilities
$184.35B
Current Ratio
0.67
Interest Coverage
-
Debt/EBITDA
-
Earnings Per Share
Revenue & Net Income
Free Cash Flow
Income Breakdown
Historical statement
Margins over time
Debt over time
How heavy the debt is
Growth grid
Growth — Revenue
Fair Value Estimation
Fair Value
$1431.13
Current Price
$492.35
Margin of Safety
+65.6%
Fair Value Range
$930.23 - $1932.02
Spread across the valuation methods used, not a statistically calibrated confidence interval.
Estimation Methods
Valuation Metrics
P/E Ratio
11.90
ROE
54.4%
P/B Ratio
6.83
P/FCF
5.39
Gross Margin
-
ROIC
-
Profitability Radar
Value Creation (Economic Moat)
ROIC
-
WACC
9.8%
ROIC − WACC
-
Fundamental Analysis Criteria
Passed (16)
- EPS shows upward trend
- EPS CAGR 14.08%
- Price CAGR 17.53%
- P/FCF 5.39
- Positive Free Cash Flow
- CapEx intensity
- Low reliance on intangibles
- ROE 61.7%
- Revenue Growth 5Y 9.6%
- Analyst Consensus 50% Buy
- Earnings Surprise avg 3.9%
- PEG Ratio 0.45
- Earnings Quality (OCF/NI) 2.08
- Share Dilution -4.6%
- Net Margin Trend 19.9% vs 17.7%
- Piotroski F-Score 6/9
Failed (5)
- P/B Ratio 6.83
- Debt/Equity ratio
- Return on Tangible Assets
- Price below Graham Number
- DCF valuation (Fairly valued)
Unavailable (7)
- ROIC NaN%
- Gross Margin NaN%
- Dividend Payout NaN%
- Operating Margin NaN%
- Current Ratio
- Interest Coverage
- Debt/EBITDA
Piotroski F-Score
Mixed signals: some areas need attention
Earnings Quality
High quality: earnings backed by cash
Share Dilution
Buying back shares. Shareholder friendly
Institutional Holdings
Governance
Executive Team
| Name | Title | Age |
|---|---|---|
| Mr. Walter S. Berman | Executive VP, CFO & Chief Risk Officer | 82 |
| Mr. William F. Truscott | CEO of Columbia Threadneedle & Interim Global Chief Investment Officer | 65 |
| Mr. Gerard P. Smyth | Executive VP and Head of Technology, Service & Operations | 63 |
| Ms. Dawn M. Brockman | Senior VP, Corporate Controller & Principal Accounting Officer | 52 |
| Stephanie M. Rabe | Head of Investor Relations | - |
| Ms. Heather J. Melloh | Executive VP & General Counsel | 53 |
| Ms. Deirdre D. Davey McGraw | Executive Vice President of Marketing, Strategy & Communications | 54 |
| Ms. Kelli Ann Hunter Petruzillo | Executive Vice President of Human Resources | 64 |
| Mr. David M. Joy | Chief Market Strategist | - |
| Mr. William J. Williams | President of Wealth Management Advisor Group | 57 |
Audit Risk
9
Board Risk
5
Compensation Risk
7
Shareholder Rights Risk
5
Part 2 · The price and when to enter
This part won't tell you whether the company is worth owning: it helps you choose when to buy it, once the fundamentals have convinced you. Inside: technical analysis, potential, historical drawdowns, gamma exposure.
Documents
- View document
Annual Report (10-K)
A yearly overview of the business, its financial results, and the risks it faces.
Filed on 2026-02-19
- View document
Quarterly Report (10-Q)
A snapshot of financial performance for the most recent three-month period.
Filed on 2026-08-04
- View document
Current Report (8-K)
An announcement of a major event, such as a leadership change or big news.
Filed on 2026-07-23
via SEC EDGAR
Income History
via SEC EDGAR
Latest News
Recent headlines for AMP, sourced from Markets Gazette.
- 4/23/2026NEUTRALTranscript: Ameriprise Finl Q1 2026 Earnings Conference Call
Ameriprise Financial Inc. held its Q1 2026 Earnings Conference Call on April 23, 2026. While the transcript itself does not contain specific financial figures or forward-looking statements that would immediately impact the stock price, it provides a platform for management to discuss operational performance, strategic initiatives, and market outlook. Investors will scrutinize the call for insights into revenue streams, client acquisition, asset management growth, and any commentary on the broader economic environment affecting financial services. The absence of immediate, concrete data points in the title suggests a neutral stance pending detailed analysis of the full transcript.
via Markets Gazette