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InterDigital, Inc. (IDCC)

Fair Value
TechnologySoftware - ApplicationUnited States

Fundamental

77

Price

$326.07

Market Cap

$8.41B

Part 1 · What the company is worth

Overview

InterDigital is a research and development company, not a manufacturer: it designs and patents foundational technologies for wireless communications (3G, 4G, 5G and now 6G research), video compression and, more recently, AI, and then licenses those patents to the companies that actually build and sell devices. Its output is intellectual property — a portfolio of tens of thousands of patents and patent applications, many of them declared essential to industry standards — plus the engineering work and standards-body participation that keeps generating new ones. Customers are smartphone makers such as Samsung, Apple and vivo, consumer-electronics and TV manufacturers, laptop and IoT makers, automotive suppliers, and, in an emerging program, video streaming and cloud service providers. InterDigital operates as a single reportable segment, though it reports its revenue split across smartphone and consumer-electronics/IoT/automotive end markets.

How it makes money

Revenue comes from patent license agreements. The majority is fixed-fee: a licensee pays a pre-agreed amount over a multi-year term regardless of how many units it ships, which makes a large part of the revenue base visible in advance — the company tracks this as recurring revenue and reported it at $582.4 million on an annualized basis at the end of 2025. A smaller part is variable royalties tied to the licensee's actual unit sales. On top of that sits catch-up revenue: when a manufacturer that has been selling unlicensed products finally signs, or when an arbitration or court sets the royalty, InterDigital books a lump sum covering the past period. Catch-up revenue was $277.4 million in 2025 against $460.1 million in 2024, and it is what makes reported revenue jump around from year to year even when the underlying licensing base is growing. Costs are largely fixed — engineers, patent prosecution, litigation — so incremental licensing revenue drops through to profit.

Revenue by segment

Smartphone81.4%

Licenses to makers of smartphones and other wireless handheld devices — Samsung, Apple, vivo and others — covering cellular standard-essential patents. Revenue rose to $678.9 million in 2025 from $597.5 million in 2024, helped by the Samsung arbitration decision and the vivo agreement.

CE, IoT/Auto18.5%

Licenses to manufacturers of televisions, laptops, connected devices and automotive systems, drawing on both wireless and video-compression patents. Revenue fell to $154.6 million in 2025 from $268.7 million in 2024, because 2024 contained the large catch-up payments from the Samsung TV and Lenovo settlements.

Other0.1%

Residual revenue outside the two licensing programmes, including technology-solutions and sundry items. It amounted to $0.5 million in 2025 and is immaterial to the group.

Competitive moat

Patents and licences · Narrow

The advantage is the patent portfolio itself: tens of thousands of patents and applications, a large share declared essential to cellular and video standards, which a device maker cannot design around if it wants its product to work with the network and the codecs everyone else uses. That is a real legal exclusivity, renewed by continuous R&D spending and by sitting at the standards bodies where the next generation is defined. It is narrow rather than wide because the exclusivity is bounded on three sides: standard-essential patents carry FRAND commitments that cap what can be charged, individual patents expire, and collecting depends on renewing agreements with a handful of very large counterparties who routinely litigate or go to arbitration before paying. The company itself lists difficulty entering and renewing licences, and unfavourable arbitration or court determinations, among its principal risks.

What drives demand

Moderately cyclical

Two different rhythms sit on top of each other. Underneath is the volume of devices sold worldwide — smartphones, televisions, laptops, cars — which follows the consumer electronics cycle; but because most agreements are fixed-fee rather than per-unit, a weak year for handset shipments does not translate one-for-one into weaker licensing revenue. What actually moves reported revenue is contractual: when a large licence is signed, renewed, or decided by an arbitrator, and how much of the payment covers past unlicensed sales. That is why 2025 revenue fell against 2024 even as the recurring base rose — 2024 carried larger catch-up payments. A beginner should read the yearly revenue line as lumpy by construction, and look at the recurring base to see the underlying trend.

Key risks

  • Expansion into new revenue opportunities may not succeed — The company states that its plans to expand its revenue opportunities may not be successful. Growth beyond the established smartphone programme — consumer electronics, IoT, automotive, and the newer service-provider licensing of video streaming and cloud platforms — depends on persuading categories of customers that have not historically taken licences.
  • Difficulty signing and renewing licence agreements — The filing warns that challenges relating to its ability to enter into new licence agreements and renew existing ones could cause revenue and cash flow to decline. Because most revenue sits in fixed-fee contracts with defined terms, each expiry is a renegotiation on which a sizeable block of revenue depends.
  • Royalties set by arbitrators, courts or regulators — Royalties and other licence terms can end up being determined through arbitration, third-party adjudication, or regulatory and court proceedings, and those bodies can decide against the company. The price of a licence is therefore not always InterDigital's to set.
  • Costly litigation to enforce and defend the patents — The company expects to continue to be involved in a number of costly litigation, arbitration and administrative proceedings, both to enforce its intellectual property rights and to defend its licensing practices against challenge. Legal cost is a permanent, and lumpy, feature of the business model.
  • Changes to patent law and standards-body IP policies — Patent and litigation reform legislation, rule changes at the USPTO and foreign patent offices, legislation affecting enforcement mechanisms and available remedies, changes to the intellectual-property policies of worldwide standards bodies, and rulings in legal proceedings could all force the company to change how it invests in R&D and how it prosecutes, licenses and enforces patents, with a potential material adverse effect on the business.
  • Deterioration in US–China relations and trade conditions — The company identifies deterioration in United States–China relations, or in broader trade and geopolitical conditions, as a risk to its business and operations. Several of its largest licensees and licensing targets are Chinese handset and electronics manufacturers.

Customer concentration

Concentration is high. The 10-K states that in fiscal 2025 revenue from Samsung, Apple and vivo — in that order — each comprised 10% or more of consolidated revenue. The filing does not disclose the individual percentages, so the combined weight of the three cannot be read from it, only that each crossed the threshold. The practical consequence is that the timing of a single renegotiation, arbitration or settlement with one of these counterparties can visibly move a whole year's results.

The case for

Buyers argue that the recurring base is what matters and that it is growing: annualized recurring revenue reached $582.4 million at the end of 2025, up from $468.0 million a year earlier, meaning a larger share of future revenue is already contracted before any new deal is signed. They point out that the biggest disputes have been resolved in the company's favour — the Samsung arbitration set royalties of $1.05 billion over an eight-year term — which both removes uncertainty and sets a reference price for the next negotiations. They note that the cost base is fixed, so each additional licence converts almost entirely into cash, and that the untouched ground is large: consumer electronics, IoT and automotive are under-licensed relative to smartphones, and the newer programme aimed at video streaming and cloud service providers addresses an entirely new class of payer. Continued participation in 6G and video standards, they argue, keeps refreshing the portfolio as older patents expire.

The case against

Sellers fear that the revenue line is an artefact of legal outcomes rather than of an operating business. Catch-up payments — $277.4 million in 2025 and $460.1 million in 2024 — are one-off collections for the past, and a year that looks strong can simply be a year in which an old dispute was settled; the company's own 2026 outlook of $675–775 million sits below 2025's $834.0 million. They point to concentration: three licensees each above 10% of revenue, each renegotiation an event, and the company itself warning that arbitrators, courts and regulators may set terms against it. They note that the asset decays — patents expire, and FRAND commitments on standard-essential patents cap what can be charged — so the portfolio must be rebuilt continuously through R&D whose payoff is uncertain. They add that legislative and standards-body rule changes, cited in the risk factors, could weaken enforcement remedies altogether, and that a meaningful part of the licensee base is Chinese, exposing collections to US–China trade and geopolitical deterioration.

Generated on September 18, 2026 with claude-haiku-4-5 — shared with all users

Direct competitors

Who this company fights with for the same customers

Compare

Generated on September 18, 2026 with claude-haiku-4-5 — shared with all users

P/E: 21.0Score: 67Market cap: $203.97B

Qualcomm's QTL licensing division holds the largest declared portfolio of cellular essential patents and charges handset makers a device-level royalty, directly limiting what those same manufacturers are willing to pay InterDigital.

Nokia Corporation (Nokia Oyj)NOK

Nokia Technologies licenses one of the largest cellular standard-essential patent portfolios to the same smartphone, consumer-electronics and video-streaming licensees InterDigital signs, so the two bid for a share of the same royalty budget on the same devices.

Telefonaktiebolaget LM EricssonERIC

Ericsson runs a comparable 3G/4G/5G standard-essential patent licensing programme aimed at handset makers worldwide, negotiating rates with the same licensees and, like InterDigital, enforcing them through litigation and arbitration when talks fail.

Dolby Laboratories, Inc.DLB

Dolby licenses video and imaging technology (Dolby Vision, HDR) to the TV makers and streaming platforms InterDigital targets with its own video-coding patents, and the two are in open litigation over patents asserted against Disney's streaming services.

Adeia Inc.ADEA

Adeia is a pure-play patent licensing company with no products of its own, monetising media-entertainment and semiconductor portfolios among the same pay-TV, streaming and consumer-electronics licensees InterDigital approaches.

Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (华为技术有限公司)Not tracked

Huawei owns one of the world's largest 5G standard-essential patent portfolios and has built an outbound licensing programme addressed to the same handset, automotive and Wi-Fi device makers InterDigital licenses, competing for the same royalty pool.

Balance Sheet & Liquidity

Revenue

$788M

Trailing 12 months (through 6/30/2026)

Net Income

$302M

Trailing 12 months (through 6/30/2026)

Free Cash Flow

$529M

Total Equity

$1.10B

Total Liabilities

$963M

Current Ratio

1.74

Interest Coverage

9.03

Debt/EBITDA

0.75

Earnings Per Share

Revenue & Net Income

Free Cash Flow

Income Breakdown

Historical statement

Margins over time

Debt over time

How heavy the debt is

Growth grid

Growth — Revenue

Fair Value Estimation

General caseFairly Valued

Fair Value

$433.16

Current Price

$326.07

Margin of Safety

+24.7%

Fair Value Range

$281.55 - $584.76

Spread across the valuation methods used, not a statistically calibrated confidence interval.

Estimation Methods

Analyst price target:$462.67
Discounted cash flow (DCF):$639.59
Earnings multiple (P/E):$309.53
Graham growth formula:$437.58
Earnings power value (EPV):$62.26
Justified P/B:$111.39
Dividend discount (Gordon):$27.98
P/FFO, funds from operations:$300.19
Mid-cycle earnings:$302.75
Revenue multiple:$117.47
Analyst Consensus:Strong Buy (10B / 1H / 0S)
Last Earnings Surprise:+266.30%

Valuation Metrics

P/E Ratio

38.18

ROE

36.9%

P/B Ratio

7.00

P/FCF

15.17

Gross Margin

-

ROIC

19.6%

Profitability Radar

Value Creation (Economic Moat)

ROIC

19.6%

WACC

12.6%

ROIC − WACC

+7.0 pp

ROIC exceeds the cost of capital — the company is creating value for shareholders.

Fundamental Analysis Criteria

Passed (21)

  • EPS shows upward trend
  • EPS CAGR 19.51%
  • Price CAGR 13.59%
  • ROIC 19.6%
  • P/FCF 15.17
  • Debt/Equity ratio
  • Operating Margin 43.8%
  • Positive Free Cash Flow
  • CapEx intensity
  • Current Ratio
  • Interest Coverage
  • Debt/EBITDA
  • Return on Tangible Assets
  • Low reliance on intangibles
  • ROE 26.8%
  • Revenue Growth 5Y 18.4%
  • Analyst Consensus 91% Buy
  • Earnings Surprise avg 82.7%
  • PEG Ratio 0.54
  • Earnings Quality (OCF/NI) 1.85
  • Piotroski F-Score 6/9

Failed (5)

  • P/B Ratio 7.00
  • Price below Graham Number
  • DCF valuation (Overvalued)
  • Share Dilution 16.0%
  • Net Margin Trend 38.3% vs 51.9%

Unavailable (2)

  • Gross Margin NaN%
  • Dividend Payout NaN%

Piotroski F-Score

6/9

Mixed signals: some areas need attention

score
criteria

Earnings Quality

1.85

High quality: earnings backed by cash

Share Dilution

16.0%

Issuing new shares, diluting ownership

Institutional Holdings

Governance

Executive Team

NameTitleAge
Mr. Lawrence Chen J.D.President, CEO & Director54
Mr. Richard J. BrezskiExecutive VP, CFO & Treasurer52
Dr. Rajesh PankajExecutive VP & CTO60
Mr. Joshua D. Schmidt J.D.Executive VP, Chief Legal Officer & Corporate Secretary41
Ms. Julia C. MattisExecutive VP & Chief Licensing Officer46
Mr. Raiford Garrabrant C.F.A.Head of Investor Relations-
Mr. Robert StienExecutive VP & Chief Communications and Public Policy Officer-
Mr. Xiaofei WangChair of the IEEE 802.11 AIML-
Diana PaniVP & Head of Wireless Standards-
Richard LloydCommunications Director-

Audit Risk

5

Board Risk

2

Compensation Risk

4

Shareholder Rights Risk

4

Part 2 · The price and when to enter

This part won't tell you whether the company is worth owning: it helps you choose when to buy it, once the fundamentals have convinced you. Inside: technical analysis, potential, historical drawdowns, gamma exposure.

Documents

  • Annual Report (10-K)

    A yearly overview of the business, its financial results, and the risks it faces.

    Filed on 2026-02-05

    View document
  • Quarterly Report (10-Q)

    A snapshot of financial performance for the most recent three-month period.

    Filed on 2026-07-30

    View document
  • Current Report (8-K)

    An announcement of a major event, such as a leadership change or big news.

    Filed on 2026-07-30

    View document

via SEC EDGAR

Income History

via SEC EDGAR

Latest News

Recent headlines for IDCC, sourced from Markets Gazette.

  • 3/7/2026NEUTRAL
    Disciplined Growth Investors Trim InterDigital After Strong Run in Wireless Technology Stock

    Disciplined Growth Investors has reduced its stake in InterDigital Inc. following a period of significant stock appreciation over the last twelve months. InterDigital is a key player in wireless technology, generating revenue through royalties from manufacturers who integrate its innovations into smartphones and other connected devices. While the trimming of a position by a specific investor suggests a profit-taking or rebalancing action, it does not inherently signal a negative outlook on the company's core business or future prospects. Investors should monitor broader market trends and InterDigital's ongoing innovation in the wireless sector.

via Markets Gazette