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Brown & Brown Inc (BRO)

合理估值
Financial ServicesInsurance BrokersUnited States

基本面

65

价格

$61.93

市值

$20.16B

第一部分 · 这家公司值多少

概览

Brown & Brown is one of the largest insurance intermediaries in the United States. It does not underwrite risk in its core business: it acts as an agent, broker, wholesaler and managing general underwriter, placing property & casualty, employee benefits and personal insurance with insurance companies on behalf of commercial clients, public entities, professionals and individuals. It also runs delegated-authority programs for specific trades and niches, administers the federal flood programme through Wright National Flood Insurance Company, and sells non-insurance risk-mitigation products through its finance & insurance (F&I) businesses. A limited amount of underwriting risk is retained through captive insurance operations. Fiscal 2025 revenues were $5.9 billion, up 22.8% on 2024, with $843 million coming from international operations.

盈利方式

Almost all revenue is commission and fee income earned when a policy is placed or renewed. Of $5,902 million of total 2025 revenues, $5,763 million were commissions and fees and $139 million investment and other income; within commissions and fees, $255 million were profit-sharing contingent commissions — variable payments from insurers that depend on the volume, growth and loss experience of the business placed with them. Commissions are usually a percentage of the premium, so revenue moves with insurance pricing and with the size of the exposure insured, not with the number of hours worked. Fee business is charged directly to clients for services, and the flood and program operations earn policy administration fees. The company also earns investment income on fiduciary cash held between collecting premiums and remitting them to carriers.

分部营收

Retail58.8%

Brokerage of property & casualty, employee benefits and personal insurance sold directly to commercial businesses, public and quasi-public entities, professionals and individuals, plus non-insurance risk-mitigation products sold through the F&I businesses. It generated $3,386 million of commissions and fees in 2025.

Specialty Distribution41.3%

Delegated-authority programs (managing general underwriters for professional liability, flood, and products designed for specific trades and niches) together with wholesale brokerage, which places excess and surplus lines commercial and personal risks on behalf of other retail agents. It generated $2,379 million of commissions and fees in 2025.

护城河

转换成本 · 狭窄

Brokerage revenue is renewal-based: once an account is placed, the incumbent broker holds the client's loss history, policy structure and carrier relationships, and moving broker mid-programme is disruptive, which makes retention high and new-business capture slow for competitors. The Specialty Distribution side adds underwriting authority delegated by insurers, which a new entrant cannot simply buy. These advantages are real but not impregnable: the filing itself lists disintermediation, increased competition and the loss of insurance-company relationships among its risk factors, and growth has depended heavily on acquiring other brokers rather than on organic barriers alone.

需求驱动因素

中度周期性

Insurance is bought in good times and bad — a business cannot legally or practically operate uninsured — so the volume of policies is fairly stable. What moves is the price: commissions are a percentage of premium, so revenue rises when property & casualty rates harden and falls when the market softens, and it also follows the exposures being insured (payrolls, fleet sizes, property values, construction activity), which shrink in a downturn. The company explicitly lists economic slowdown, inflation and interest rates, and fluctuation in commission revenue among its risks; profit-sharing contingent commissions are the most volatile piece, since a bad catastrophe year cuts them. Investment income on fiduciary funds moves directly with short-term interest rates.

主要风险

  • Acquisitions may not deliver what was assumed — The company discloses that it may fail to realise the anticipated benefits of acquisitions, that the assumptions underlying a transaction may prove inaccurate, and that integrating acquired businesses — including their cultures, systems and controls — is a continuing challenge.
  • Debt taken on to finance deals — Risk factors cover financing-related risks and increased indebtedness, the need to comply with debt covenants, exposure to credit-market changes and to a possible credit-rating downgrade, as well as dilution from issuing equity.
  • Loss of people and of insurer relationships — The filing flags dependence on retaining employees and key personnel, changes in culture and management, and the risk of losing relationships with insurance companies and other intermediaries on whose capacity the business depends. Reduced insurer capacity is listed separately.
  • Commissions fluctuate with premium rates and catastrophes — Disclosed risks include fluctuation in commission revenue and in the timing of commissions, the effect of natural disasters on profit-sharing contingent commissions, claims expense in the captive insurance operations, and the effect of inflation and interest rates.
  • Cyber attacks and dependence on third parties — The company lists cybersecurity attacks and IT disruption, dependence on third-party vendors, disclosure of confidential information, and compliance with data-privacy and protection rules among its risk factors.
  • Regulation of how brokers are paid — Risk factors include regulatory uncertainty over compensation arrangements, claims and regulatory proceedings, compliance with non-U.S. law, changes to federal government programmes (which matter for the flood business), and tort reform reducing demand for liability insurance.
  • Concentrated shareholder control and goodwill — The filing notes concentration of shareholder control, the limits of internal controls in preventing fraud, and the risk of goodwill impairment and of changes in accounting estimates — goodwill being large after years of acquisitions.

客户集中度

There is no meaningful concentration. The filing states that no material part of the Retail segment is attributable to a single customer or a few customers, and that in 2025 the largest single Retail customer represented 0.6% of that segment's commissions and fees. In Specialty Distribution the largest customer represented approximately 7.2% of the segment's commissions and fees. The company does not disclose a combined top-customers share for the group, so no consolidated figure is given here.

看多理由

Buyers argue that brokerage is an attractive way to own insurance without owning underwriting risk: Brown & Brown collects a share of premium, keeps almost no claims liability, needs little capital to grow and earns fee income that renews year after year. They point to revenue up 22.8% in 2025 to $5.9 billion, to a long record of buying smaller agencies and folding them into a decentralised sales culture, and to the Specialty Distribution side — programs and wholesale — where delegated underwriting authority and niche expertise command higher margins than plain retail broking. They also note that fiduciary cash earns interest while rates stay elevated, and that international expansion, $843 million of revenue in 2025, opens a larger pool of targets.

看空理由

Sellers fear that the growth is bought rather than earned: total revenue rose 22.8% in 2025 but the company reported an organic revenue decrease of 2.8% in the fourth quarter, which raises the question of what happens when acquisitions are financed with more debt and integration goes less smoothly than assumed — both risks the company discloses itself, alongside covenant compliance, credit-rating downgrade and goodwill impairment. They also fear the price cycle turning: commissions are a percentage of premium, so a softening property & casualty market cuts revenue with no change in workload, while a heavy catastrophe year cuts the $255 million of profit-sharing contingent commissions and raises claims costs in the captive operations. Longer term they point to the company's own risk factors on disintermediation, increased competition, regulatory scrutiny of how intermediaries are compensated, and dependence on retaining producers whose client relationships can leave with them.

Generated on 2026年9月18日 with claude-haiku-4-5 — shared with all users

Direct competitors

Who this company fights with for the same customers

Compare

Generated on 2026年9月18日 with claude-haiku-4-5 — shared with all users

P/E: 37.8Score: 57Market cap: $58.81B

Gallagher is the closest match to Brown & Brown's model, chasing the same US middle-market commercial and employee-benefits accounts through retail brokerage, programs and wholesale, and bidding against it for the same independent agencies in acquisitions.

P/E: 20.9Score: 67Market cap: $80.66B

Through Marsh McLennan Agency it sells property-casualty and benefits brokerage to the same US mid-sized businesses Brown & Brown's Retail segment serves, and competes with it for large commercial accounts.

P/E: 98.5Score: 65Market cap: —

A pure wholesale and delegated-underwriting firm that competes head-on with Brown & Brown's Programs and Wholesale Brokerage segments for excess-and-surplus placements and for the retail agents who send them business.

Hub International LimitedNot tracked

A privately held North American retail broker built, like Brown & Brown, by buying local agencies, it competes for the same middle-market commercial, benefits and personal-lines clients across the US and Canada.

WTW plc (Willis Towers Watson)WTW

Competes for the same commercial property-casualty placements and employee-benefits consulting mandates, particularly among larger corporate clients of Brown & Brown's Retail segment.

Aon plcAON

Competes for commercial insurance brokerage and risk-advisory revenue from the same US corporate buyers, and through its NFP arm for the mid-market and benefits accounts Brown & Brown targets.

资产负债表与流动性

营收

$6.79B

最近12个月(截至2026/6/30)

净利润

$1.21B

最近12个月(截至2026/6/30)

自由现金流

$1.38B

股东权益合计

$12.57B

负债合计

$17.42B

流动比率

1.13

利息覆盖率

-

债务/EBITDA

2.93

每股收益

营收与净利润

自由现金流

收入构成

历史财务表

利润率变化

债务变化

债务负担有多重

增长一览表

增长 — 营业收入

公允价值估算

一般情形合理估值

公允价值

$81.04

当前价格

$61.93

安全边际

+23.6%

公允价值区间

$52.68 - $109.41

所用估值方法之间的离散区间,并非经过统计校准的置信区间。

估算方法

分析师目标价:$76.50
现金流折现法(DCF):$149.14
市盈率法(P/E):$42.49
格雷厄姆成长公式:$101.03
盈利能力价值(EPV):$57.60
合理市净率(P/B):$52.47
股息折现模型(戈登模型):$16.14
P/FFO(运营资金):数据不足,无法计算
周期中段收益:数据不足,无法计算
市销率法(P/S):$53.19
分析师共识:持有 (7B / 18H / 1S)
最近财报超预期:-2.15%

估值指标

市盈率(P/E)

19.46

ROE

8.4%

市净率(P/B)

1.62

P/FCF

14.09

毛利率

-

ROIC

-

盈利能力雷达图

价值创造(经济护城河)

ROIC

-

WACC

6.5%

ROIC − WACC

-

基本面分析标准

通过(16)

  • EPS shows upward trend
  • EPS CAGR 6.02%
  • Price CAGR 11.43%
  • P/FCF 14.09
  • P/B Ratio 1.62
  • Debt/Equity ratio
  • Positive Free Cash Flow
  • CapEx intensity
  • Current Ratio
  • Debt/EBITDA
  • Return on Tangible Assets
  • ROE 9.6%
  • Revenue Growth 5Y 17.7%
  • Earnings Surprise avg 2.9%
  • PEG Ratio 1.19
  • Earnings Quality (OCF/NI) 1.26

未通过(7)

  • Low reliance on intangibles
  • Price below Graham Number
  • DCF valuation (Overvalued)
  • Analyst Consensus 27% Buy
  • Share Dilution 16.2%
  • Net Margin Trend 17.8% vs 19.9%
  • Piotroski F-Score 4/9

不可用(5)

  • ROIC NaN%
  • Gross Margin NaN%
  • Dividend Payout NaN%
  • Operating Margin NaN%
  • Interest Coverage

Piotroski F-评分

4/9

信号混杂:部分领域需关注

score
criteria

盈利质量

1.26

高质量:盈利有现金流支撑

股权稀释

16.2%

正在发行新股,稀释所有权

机构持股

公司治理

管理团队

姓名职位年龄
Mr. J. Powell Brown C.P.C.U.CEO, President & Director57
Mr. R. Andrew Watts CPAExecutive VP & CFO56
Mr. Stephen Patrick HearnPresident of Retail Segment, Executive VP & COO59
Mr. Chris L. WalkerExecutive VP & Chairman of Specialty Distribution Segment67
Mr. P. Barrett BrownExecutive Officer52
Mr. Paul Michael GallagherPrincipal Accounting Officer & Controller55
Mr. Kiet TranChief Technology Officer-
Ms. Eileen AkersonSenior VP & Chief Legal Officer-
Jenny GocoDirector of Communications-
Ms. Julie L. TurpinExecutive VP & Chief People Officer54

审计风险

8

董事会风险

8

薪酬风险

6

股东权利风险

1

第二部分 · 价格与买入时机

这一部分不判断公司是否值得拥有:它帮助你在基本面说服你之后,选择何时买入。包含:技术分析、潜力、历史回撤、Gamma 敞口。

文件

  • 年度报告(10-K)

    对公司业务、财务业绩和风险的年度概述。

    提交日期:2026-02-12

    查看文件
  • 季度报告(10-Q)

    最近三个月财务表现的最新情况。

    提交日期:2026-07-27

    查看文件
  • 临时报告(8-K)

    关于重大事件(如管理层变动或重要公告)的通知。

    提交日期:2026-09-10

    查看文件

via SEC EDGAR

损益历史

via SEC EDGAR

Latest News

Recent headlines for BRO, sourced from Markets Gazette.

  • 2/27/2026POSITIVE
    This Brown & Brown Analyst Turns Bullish; Here Are Top 5 Upgrades For Friday

    An analyst has turned bullish on Brown & Brown, suggesting potential appreciation for the stock. This upgrade from a market expert is a positive signal for investors, indicating growing confidence in the company's future prospects. Such revisions can often precede positive movements in share price, making Brown & Brown a stock to watch closely for those seeking growth opportunities in the insurance sector, anticipating potential outperformance.

via Markets Gazette