MarketAxess Holdings, Inc. (MKTX)
Juste valeurFondamental
67
Prix
$164.03
Capitalisation boursière
$5.77B
Partie 1 · Ce que vaut l'entreprise
Vue d'ensemble
MarketAxess Holdings operates electronic trading platforms for fixed-income securities — corporate bonds (U.S. investment grade and high yield, eurobonds, emerging markets), municipal bonds and U.S. Treasuries. Institutional investors and broker-dealers meet on its platforms instead of negotiating bond by bond over the phone. Its distinctive feature is Open Trading, an all-to-all anonymous marketplace where any participant can trade with any other rather than only investor-to-dealer; the 10-K reports roughly 1,800 firms active in that pool and estimates it delivered $496.4 million of price improvement to clients in 2025. Around the execution business the company sells market data (including the CP+ AI-driven pricing engine), regulatory trade reporting and matching, and trading technology. MarketAxess is an intermediary: it does not take principal risk on the bonds traded, it takes a fee on the trade.
Comment l'entreprise gagne de l'argent
Most of the money is a commission on trades executed on the platforms. Commissions come in two forms: variable transaction fees, charged per trade and usually scaled to the size and maturity of the bond, and fixed distribution fees, a subscription-style charge dealers pay for access to the platform. In 2025 variable transaction fees were $600.4 million and fixed distribution fees $134.2 million, out of $846.3 million of total revenue. The rest is recurring service revenue: information services (data and pricing subscriptions), post-trade services (regulatory reporting and trade matching) and technology services, together $111.6 million in 2025. So the top line tracks how much bond volume moves across the platforms, cushioned by a smaller subscription base.
Chiffre d'affaires par segment
Fees earned on bond trades executed on the platforms — a variable fee per transaction paid mainly by institutional investors, plus fixed distribution fees paid by broker-dealers for platform access.
Subscriptions to market data and analytics, including the CP+ pricing engine and composite bond pricing, sold to asset managers, dealers and other market participants.
Regulatory transaction reporting, trade matching and transparency tools sold mainly to European and UK financial institutions that must report their trades.
Trading technology licensed to clients, including execution management and algorithmic trading tools used alongside the company's venues.
Avantage concurrentiel
Effets de réseau · ÉtroitThe advantage is liquidity begetting liquidity: the more investors and dealers quote on Open Trading, the better the prices, and better prices attract more participants — a pool of roughly 1,800 active firms that a new entrant cannot simply buy. Years of executed trades also feed the CP+ pricing data that the company then sells back to the market, which is an intangible a smaller rival cannot replicate. The reason for calling it narrow rather than wide is that the company's own filing stresses substantial competition and a rapidly evolving industry, and that clients can and do route the same order flow to competing venues; the network is real but it has not prevented rivals from taking share in electronic credit trading.
Ce qui stimule la demande
Modérément cycliqueRevenue follows the volume of bonds changing hands, and that volume has two opposing drivers over a cycle. Bond issuance and portfolio rebalancing fall when credit markets freeze, which hurts; but volatility and repricing episodes push more investors to trade and to seek the platform's all-to-all liquidity, which helps. Electronic adoption in fixed income is also still growing structurally, a tailwind that runs underneath the cycle. The subscription lines — data, post-trade reporting, technology, together about one euro in eight — are steadier than commissions. The result is a business that is less cyclical than an investment bank but clearly exposed to how active credit markets are, and to how much of that activity lands on its own venues rather than a competitor's.
Principaux risques
- Demand depends on factors outside the company's control — The filing states that global economic, political and market factors beyond its control — interest rate movements, inflation, geopolitical tension — could reduce demand for its services, and that a decline in fixed-income trading volumes would harm its business and profitability.
- Substantial competition — The company discloses that it faces substantial competition that could reduce trading on its platforms or its market share and harm its financial performance.
- A rapidly evolving industry — The filing warns that the industry is evolving quickly and that, if the company cannot adapt effectively to keep pace, it may not compete effectively — with a material adverse effect on its business, financial condition and results.
- Dependence on broker-dealer clients — The company relies on broker-dealer clients to provide liquidity on its platforms; the filing notes that these clients may reduce their activity or move it to competing venues, lowering volumes.
- Regulation, and self-clearing — As a regulated financial intermediary the company is subject to extensive government oversight that can affect volumes and raise costs, including changes in data protection and AI rules; it also flags the operational, liquidity and regulatory demands of self-clearing and the effect of central clearing mandates for U.S. Treasury securities.
- Technology, cybersecurity and third-party suppliers — The business runs on its own systems and on third-party providers; the filing identifies information-technology and cybersecurity failures, and the failure of a supplier, as risks to operations, and adds that developing and deploying AI technology can expose it to reputational harm and liability.
Concentration des clients
The filing does not disclose a percentage of revenue from its largest clients. It does warn, as a risk factor, that certain clients may account for a significant portion of trading volume on its platforms, and the business depends on a relatively small group of broker-dealers to supply liquidity alongside a much broader base of institutional investors. Without a stated number, treat the concentration as acknowledged by the company but unquantified.
Les arguments en faveur
Buyers argue that fixed income is still early in its move from the telephone to the screen, and that whoever owns the deepest all-to-all liquidity pool collects a toll on that shift: Open Trading already gathers around 1,800 firms and produced an estimated $496.4 million of price improvement for clients in 2025, which is the argument for why participants keep coming back. They point to a capital-light model — the company takes a fee, not principal risk on the bonds — and to the services lines, which reached a record $111.6 million in 2025 and grew faster than commissions, giving a recurring, less volume-dependent layer on top. The data franchise, they add, is a by-product of the trading itself: every executed trade improves CP+, which is then sold back to the market.
Les arguments contre
Sellers fear that the network is less exclusive than it looks. The company's own filing stresses substantial competition and a rapidly evolving industry, and rival venues have been winning share in exactly the protocols — portfolio trading, dealer-initiated flow — where growth has been fastest. They note that commissions are 86.8% of revenue and are tied to volumes the company does not control, while total revenue grew only 3.6% in 2025 and net income fell 9.9% year on year: growth that slow makes the outcome depend on holding share, not just on the market expanding. They also point to dependence on a limited set of broker-dealers for liquidity, to the operational and regulatory load the company itself flags around self-clearing and central clearing of Treasuries, and to the risk that better-capitalised competitors or new AI-driven pricing tools erode the pricing power of the data business.
Generated on 19 septembre 2026 with claude-haiku-4-5 — shared with all users
Direct competitors
Who this company fights with for the same customers
Generated on 19 septembre 2026 with claude-haiku-4-5 — shared with all users
Tradeweb runs the closest rival electronic platform for institutional fixed-income trading, competing with MarketAxess for the same asset managers and dealers in US credit as well as in rates and emerging markets.
Through BondPoint, TMC Bonds and Creditex, ICE offers electronic bond and credit-derivative execution alongside fixed-income pricing data, addressing the same dealers and institutional clients.
CME's BrokerTec platform is a direct rival in electronic US Treasury and repo trading, the rates business MarketAxess has been expanding into.
Trumid is a privately held US corporate bond trading network whose daily volumes in investment grade and high yield now sit within a whisker of MarketAxess's, fighting for the same buy-side order flow.
Bloomberg's terminal-based execution venues and fixed-income data services compete with MarketAxess both for bond trading flow and for the market-data and analytics budgets of the same institutions.
TP ICAP competes for institutional bond execution through Liquidnet's fixed-income venue and Neptune's pre-trade data network, targeting the same buy-side credit desks.
Bilan & Liquidités
Chiffre d'affaires
$870M
12 derniers mois (au 30/06/2026)
Résultat net
$306M
12 derniers mois (au 30/06/2026)
Flux de trésorerie libre
$374M
Capitaux propres totaux
$1.15B
Passif total
$777M
Ratio de liquidité général
2.19
Couverture des intérêts
59.88
Dette/EBITDA
0.43
Bénéfice par action
Chiffre d'affaires & Résultat net
Flux de trésorerie libre
Décomposition du résultat
État historique
Marges dans le temps
La dette dans le temps
Le poids de la dette
Grille de la croissance
Croissance — Chiffre d'affaires
Estimation de la juste valeur
Juste valeur
$147.48
Prix actuel
$164.03
Marge de sécurité
-11.2%
Fourchette de juste valeur
$114.58 - $180.38
Écart entre les méthodes de valorisation utilisées, pas un intervalle de confiance calibré statistiquement.
Méthodes d'estimation
Indicateurs de valorisation
Ratio P/E
19.38
ROE
21.5%
Ratio P/B
4.66
P/FCF
29.69
Marge brute
-
ROIC
-
Radar de rentabilité
Création de valeur (avantage concurrentiel)
ROIC
-
WACC
8.8%
ROIC − WACC
-
Critères d'analyse fondamentale
Réussi (14)
- EPS shows upward trend
- EPS CAGR 18.83%
- P/FCF 29.69
- Debt/Equity ratio
- Operating Margin 40.5%
- Positive Free Cash Flow
- CapEx intensity
- Interest Coverage
- Debt/EBITDA
- Return on Tangible Assets
- ROE 24.7%
- Earnings Surprise avg 15.3%
- Share Dilution -1.4%
- Net Margin Trend 35.2% vs 26.6%
Échoué (9)
- Price CAGR 1.09%
- P/B Ratio 4.66
- Low reliance on intangibles
- Price below Graham Number
- DCF valuation (Overvalued)
- Revenue Growth 5Y 4.2%
- Analyst Consensus 39% Buy
- Earnings Quality (OCF/NI) 0.65
- Piotroski F-Score 4/9
Indisponible (5)
- ROIC NaN%
- Gross Margin NaN%
- Dividend Payout NaN%
- Current Ratio
- PEG Ratio (need PE > 0 and growth > 0)
Score F de Piotroski
Signaux mixtes : certains domaines nécessitent attention
Qualité des bénéfices
Modérée : certain écart entre profits et trésorerie
Dilution du capital
Rachat d'actions. Favorable aux actionnaires
Participations institutionnelles
Gouvernance
Équipe dirigeante
| Nom | Titre | Âge |
|---|---|---|
| Mr. Christopher Robert Concannon J.D. | CEO & Director | 58 |
| Ms. Ilene J. Fiszel Bieler | Chief Financial Officer | 56 |
| Mr. Dean Berry | Group COO & CEO of Europe, the Middle East & Africa, and Asia-Pacific | 52 |
| Mr. Kevin M. McPherson | Chief Revenue Officer | 54 |
| Mr. Nitin A. Mirwani | Chief Accounting Officer | 45 |
| Mr. William Quan | Chief Technology Officer | 42 |
| Mr. Stephen C. Davidson | Head of Investor Relations | - |
| Mr. Scott Pintoff J.D. | General Counsel & Corporate Secretary | 54 |
| Ms. Julie Sheffet | Chief Human Resources Officer | - |
| Mr. James Nevil Blair Rucker | Global Head of Operations Services | 69 |
Risque d'audit
1
Risque du conseil
1
Risque de rémunération
2
Risque droits des actionnaires
1
Partie 2 · Le prix et le moment d'entrer
Cette partie ne dit pas si l'entreprise vaut la peine : elle aide à choisir quand l'acheter, une fois que les fondamentaux vous ont convaincu. À l'intérieur : analyse technique, potentiel, baisses historiques, exposition gamma.
Documents
- Voir le document
Rapport annuel (10-K)
Un aperçu annuel de l'activité, des résultats financiers et des risques de l'entreprise.
Déposé le 2026-02-24
- Voir le document
Rapport trimestriel (10-Q)
Une mise à jour de la performance financière des trois derniers mois.
Déposé le 2026-08-07
- Voir le document
Rapport d'événement important (8-K)
Un avis concernant un événement important, comme un changement de direction ou une annonce majeure.
Déposé le 2026-09-29
via SEC EDGAR
Historique des résultats
via SEC EDGAR
Latest News
Recent headlines for MKTX, sourced from Markets Gazette.
- 3/4/2026POSITIVEVan Den Berg Boosts MarketAxess Stake as Electronic Platforms Compete for Credit Trading Flow
Van Den Berg Management has increased its stake in MarketAxess Holdings Inc., a key player in electronic trading platforms for corporate bonds. This increased position by a significant institutional investor signals confidence in MarketAxess's business model within a rapidly evolving sector. As more credit trading moves online and competition among trading venues intensifies, MarketAxess's ability to anchor institutional bond market liquidity is crucial. This move could indicate a positive outlook on the platform's future.
via Markets Gazette