DR Horton Inc (DHI)
Fair bewertetFundamental
76
Kurs
$135.70
Marktkapitalisierung
$39.00B
Teil 1 · Was das Unternehmen wert ist
Übersicht
D.R. Horton is the largest homebuilder in the United States measured by homes closed. In fiscal 2025 (year ended September 30, 2025) it closed 84,863 homes at an average price of about $370,400, operating through 92 homebuilding divisions in 126 markets across 36 states. Almost all land development and construction work is performed by subcontractors; D.R. Horton buys or options the land, designs the product, manages the build and sells the finished home. Around the core homebuilding business it runs three adjacent operations: a rental segment that builds single-family and multi-family communities and sells them as income-producing assets, a 62%-owned publicly traded lot developer (Forestar) that supplies finished lots, and a financial services arm (DHI Mortgage plus title and insurance agencies) that finances and closes the homes it sells.
Wie das Geld verdient wird
Revenue is recognized almost entirely at closing, when a finished home is delivered to the buyer. Homes are sold from model homes by commissioned in-house salespeople and by independent brokers; the buyer puts down earnest money and contracts typically contain a financing contingency, with one to three months between signing and closing. The gross margin on home sales was 21.5% in fiscal 2025 against 23.5% the year before. Rental revenue is lumpy and comes from selling completed single-family and multi-family rental communities rather than from collecting rent. Financial services earns origination and title fees: DHI Mortgage originated or brokered 68,982 loans in fiscal 2025, mostly agency-eligible, and sells substantially all loans and the related servicing rights to third parties shortly after origination rather than holding them. Forestar sells developed lots, 83% of them to D.R. Horton itself, so that revenue is largely eliminated on consolidation.
Umsatz nach Segment
Builds and sells single-family homes, mostly entry-level and first move-up, to individual buyers across 126 US markets. The filing states this is the core business and generated 92% of consolidated revenues; segment revenues were about $31.5 billion in fiscal 2025.
Develops single-family rental communities and multi-family apartment properties and sells the completed communities to investors and rental operators. In fiscal 2025 it closed 3,460 single-family rental homes and 2,947 multi-family units, for about $1.6 billion of segment revenue.
A separately listed residential lot developer, 62% owned and consolidated, that buys raw land, entitles and develops it and sells finished lots to homebuilders. It sold 14,240 lots in fiscal 2025, 83% of them to D.R. Horton, so most of its roughly $1.7 billion of revenue is intersegment and eliminated in the consolidated figure.
DHI Mortgage originates mortgages for buyers of D.R. Horton homes and sells them on, alongside title agency and insurance agency services. Segment revenue was about $0.8 billion in fiscal 2025.
Wettbewerbsvorteil
Kostenvorteil · SchmalHomebuilding is a commoditised, locally competitive business: D.R. Horton itself says it competes on price, location, quality and design against local, regional and national builders and against the existing-home market. What it has instead of a brand advantage is scale. It is the largest builder in the country by closings, which lets it negotiate materials and subcontractor pricing on a national as well as a local basis, spread overhead over far more units, and keep a lot pipeline through its 62% stake in Forestar rather than tying up capital in raw land. Its captive mortgage arm also lets it control the financing step and use rate buydowns as a selling tool. These are real cost and distribution advantages, but they do not stop competitors entering a local market, and none of them protects volumes when rates rise.
Was die Nachfrage antreibt
ZyklischDemand for new homes is one of the most rate-sensitive things in the economy. A buyer's decision is made on the monthly payment, so mortgage rates, employment and consumer confidence move volumes directly; when rates rise, builders either lose orders or pay to buy the rate down, which shows up as a lower gross margin rather than a lower order count. Fiscal 2025 is the illustration: consolidated revenues fell 7% to $34.3 billion, closings fell 5% and home sales gross margin fell from 23.5% to 21.5%, so pre-tax income dropped 25% to $4.7 billion on a much smaller revenue decline. The company skews to entry-level buyers, who are the most payment-constrained part of the market. Against the cycle sits a slower structural driver — household formation and a long shortfall of new construction — which is why the downturns in this industry tend to be sharp but not permanent.
Wichtigste Risiken
- The business is cyclical — The company discloses that its homebuilding, rental and land development operations are cyclical and significantly affected by changes in economic, real estate and other conditions, which can adversely affect results.
- Mortgage availability and interest rates — A disclosed risk factor covers reductions in mortgage financing provided by government agencies, changes in government financing programmes, a reduced ability to sell originated loans on attractive terms, and rising mortgage rates — any of which can cut buyers' ability to obtain financing.
- Input cost inflation — The filing flags increases in the cost of land, labour, materials and services, and the possibility that the company cannot pass those increases on through higher selling prices.
- Inventory write-downs — The company discloses that it may have to take significant write-downs or impairments on the carrying value of land and home inventories, which would hit reported results. It says it tries to limit this by controlling the level of inventory investment and by buying lots that are substantially ready to build on where it can.
- Competition — A disclosed risk factor covers competition in the homebuilding and rental markets, which the company says can limit its ability to sell homes and rental properties at profitable prices. It competes for land, materials, skilled labour and financing as well as for buyers.
- Cancellations of contracts in backlog — Because contracts are typically signed one to three months before closing and usually contain a financing contingency, the company discloses that cancellations of sales contracts in backlog can reduce revenue and profitability.
- Mortgage repurchase obligations — DHI Mortgage sells substantially all the loans it originates, but the company discloses that increases in loan repurchase obligations and credit losses could hurt the financial services business and consolidated results.
- Dependence on Forestar — The company discloses that its significant investment in Forestar, and its reliance on Forestar for lot supply, could hurt results if Forestar runs into operational or financial trouble.
Kundenkonzentration
The filing does not disclose a customer concentration figure for the group, and the structure of the business makes one unlikely to be meaningful: homes are sold one at a time to tens of thousands of individual buyers — 84,863 closings in fiscal 2025 — across 126 markets, so no single customer is material. The one genuine concentration sits inside the group rather than outside it: Forestar sold 83% of its lots to D.R. Horton itself in fiscal 2025, which is an intersegment dependence, not an external customer risk. The rental segment is the exception in kind, since whole communities are sold to a small number of institutional buyers, but the filing does not quantify that.
Die Argumente dafür
Buyers argue that scale is the whole point: as the largest builder in the country by closings, D.R. Horton buys materials and subcontractor time on terms smaller builders cannot match, and spreads overhead across nearly 85,000 homes a year. They point to the asset-light land strategy — optioning lots and sourcing them through a separately financed, 62%-owned Forestar instead of warehousing raw land — as the thing that should make the next downturn less damaging than past homebuilding cycles, and to the captive mortgage arm, which sells its loans on rather than holding credit risk and gives the company a direct lever on affordability through rate buydowns. They note that even in a year when closings, margins and pre-tax income all fell, the company still earned $4.7 billion pre-tax and generated $3.4 billion of operating cash from homebuilding. And they lean on the structural argument: household formation against years of under-building, with the entry-level segment D.R. Horton dominates as the part of the market with the most unmet demand.
Die Argumente dagegen
Sellers fear that fiscal 2025 shows how the operating leverage works in reverse: revenue down 7%, closings down 5%, but pre-tax income down 25%, because holding volume in a high-rate market costs margin — home sales gross margin fell from 23.5% to 21.5%. They argue that the incentives and rate buydowns propping up demand are a direct transfer from the income statement, and that if rates stay high the choice is between shrinking volumes and thinner margins with no third option. They point to the concentration in entry-level buyers, the most payment-sensitive and least financially resilient cohort, and to the company's own disclosure that it may have to write down land and home inventories. They note that this is a business with no pricing power against local competitors or against the existing-home market, where a fall in mortgage rates would also release more used-home supply. And they remind buyers that the industry's peak earnings and peak margins have historically been the wrong moment to extrapolate.
Generated on 18. September 2026 with claude-haiku-4-5 — shared with all users
Direct competitors
Who this company fights with for the same customers
Generated on 18. September 2026 with claude-haiku-4-5 — shared with all users
The second-largest US homebuilder by closings, Lennar sells high-volume production homes to the same entry-level and first move-up buyers in the same Sun Belt and Southeastern markets, and like D.R. Horton bundles its own mortgage and title services into the sale.
Pulte builds across the same three buyer segments D.R. Horton serves — entry-level, move-up and active adult — in overlapping metropolitan markets, and competes for the same land positions and subcontractor capacity.
Through Ryan Homes and NVHomes, NVR sells affordable and move-up production homes to the same buyers in the Mid-Atlantic and Southeast, with a mortgage arm attached to the sale just as D.R. Horton has.
Meritage concentrates on entry-level and first move-up homes in Texas, Arizona, Florida and the Carolinas — precisely the states where D.R. Horton's Express Homes brand sells the most.
KB Home targets the same price-sensitive first-time buyer in California, Texas and the Southwest, and offers in-house financing through KBHS Home Loans, competing on monthly payment as much as on the house itself.
Taylor Morrison sells entry-level, move-up and resort-lifestyle homes across Florida, Texas, Arizona and the Carolinas, overlapping with D.R. Horton's largest regions and also competing in build-to-rent communities.
Bilanz & Liquidität
Umsatz
$33.35B
Letzte 12 Monate (bis 30.6.2026)
Nettogewinn
$3.05B
Letzte 12 Monate (bis 30.6.2026)
Freier Cashflow
$3.28B
Gesamtes Eigenkapital
$24.19B
Gesamtverbindlichkeiten
$10.73B
Current Ratio
4.66
Zinsdeckungsgrad
-
Schulden/EBITDA
1.74
Gewinn je Aktie
Umsatz & Nettogewinn
Freier Cashflow
Ertragsaufschlüsselung
Historische Aufstellung
Margen im Zeitverlauf
Verschuldung im Zeitverlauf
Wie schwer die Schulden wiegen
Wachstumsraster
Wachstum — Umsatz
Innerer-Wert-Schätzung
Innerer Wert
$129.74
Aktueller Kurs
$135.70
Sicherheitsmarge
-4.6%
Innerer-Wert-Spanne
$100.54 - $158.95
Streubreite zwischen den verwendeten Bewertungsmethoden, kein statistisch kalibriertes Konfidenzintervall.
Bewertungsmethoden
Bewertungskennzahlen
P/E-Verhältnis
13.03
ROE
14.8%
P/B-Verhältnis
1.60
P/FCF
11.94
Bruttomarge
22.6%
ROIC
-
Rentabilitäts-Radar
Wertschöpfung (Wettbewerbsvorteil)
ROIC
-
WACC
10.2%
ROIC − WACC
-
Fundamentalanalyse-Kriterien
Bestanden (16)
- EPS shows upward trend
- Price CAGR 17.57%
- P/FCF 11.94
- P/B Ratio 1.60
- Debt/Equity ratio
- Positive Free Cash Flow
- CapEx intensity
- Debt/EBITDA
- Return on Tangible Assets
- Low reliance on intangibles
- Price below Graham Number
- ROE 12.8%
- Revenue Growth 5Y 11.0%
- PEG Ratio 1.03
- Earnings Quality (OCF/NI) 1.10
- Share Dilution -6.6%
Nicht bestanden (6)
- Gross Margin 22.6%
- DCF valuation (Overvalued)
- Analyst Consensus 38% Buy
- Earnings Surprise avg 0.7%
- Net Margin Trend 9.2% vs 11.5%
- Piotroski F-Score 3/9
Nicht verfügbar (5)
- ROIC NaN%
- Dividend Payout NaN%
- Operating Margin NaN%
- Current Ratio
- Interest Coverage
Piotroski F-Score
Ernsthafte finanzielle Bedenken
Gewinnqualität
Hohe Qualität: Gewinne durch Cashflow gedeckt
Aktienverwässerung
Aktienrückkäufe. Aktionärsfreundlich
Institutionelle Beteiligungen
Unternehmensführung
Führungsteam
| Name | Position | Alter |
|---|---|---|
| Mr. David V. Auld | Executive Chairman | 69 |
| Mr. Paul J. Romanowski | President, CEO & Director | 54 |
| Mr. Bill W. Wheat | Executive VP & CFO | 59 |
| Mr. Michael J. Murray | Executive VP & COO | 59 |
| Mr. Aron M. Odom | Senior VP & Corporate Controller | 51 |
| Collin Michael Dawson | Vice President of Corporate Finance & Treasurer | - |
| Ms. Jessica Leigh Hansen | Senior VP of Communications & People and Head of Investor Relations | - |
| Mr. Thomas B. Montano | Senior VP, Corporate Compliance Officer & Corporate Secretary | - |
| Mr. Rick Horton | President of South Region | - |
| Matt Farris | President of West Region | - |
Prüfungsrisiko
7
Vorstandsrisiko
6
Vergütungsrisiko
5
Aktionärsrechterisiko
8
Teil 2 · Der Preis und der Einstiegszeitpunkt
Dieser Teil sagt nicht, ob das Unternehmen etwas taugt: Er hilft bei der Wahl des Kaufzeitpunkts, nachdem die Fundamentaldaten überzeugt haben. Enthalten: technische Analyse, Potenzial, historische Drawdowns, Gamma-Exposure.
Dokumente
- Dokument ansehen
Jahresbericht (10-K)
Ein jährlicher Überblick über das Geschäft, die Finanzergebnisse und die Risiken des Unternehmens.
Eingereicht am 2025-11-19
- Dokument ansehen
Quartalsbericht (10-Q)
Ein Update zur finanziellen Entwicklung der letzten drei Monate.
Eingereicht am 2026-07-23
- Dokument ansehen
Ad-hoc-Meldung (8-K)
Eine Mitteilung über ein wichtiges Ereignis, etwa einen Führungswechsel oder eine bedeutende Ankündigung.
Eingereicht am 2026-09-15
via SEC EDGAR
Ertragshistorie
via SEC EDGAR
Latest News
Recent headlines for DHI, sourced from Markets Gazette.
- 3d agoNEGATIVETassi ipotecari al 9%? Tre azioni che subiranno di più
D.R. Horton Inc. (DHI) faces significant headwinds as chief economist Selma Hepp warns of a potential 9% mortgage rate scenario if inflation reaccelerates and US Treasury yields climb due to fiscal deficits. While not the base case, such extreme rates would severely cripple housing activity, exacerbate affordability issues, and freeze inventory as buyer demand plummets. As the largest US homebuilder by volume, D.R. Horton's stock is particularly vulnerable to a downturn in the housing market driven by elevated borrowing costs, potentially impacting sales and profitability.
via Markets Gazette