Evercore Inc (EVR)
適正価値ファンダメンタル
75
株価
$262.73
時価総額
$10.06B
パート1 · 企業の価値
概要
Evercore is an independent investment bank: it sells advice, not balance sheet. Its bankers advise corporations, boards, governments and financial sponsors on mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, restructurings and capital raising, and its Evercore ISI unit provides equity research and agency trading to institutional investors. Because the firm does no commercial lending and no proprietary trading, it presents itself as free of the conflicts that sit inside a universal bank. A much smaller Investment Management arm runs wealth management and trust services for high-net-worth families. At the end of 2025 the firm had roughly 2,570 employees in 33 cities, of whom about 171 were Investment Banking Senior Managing Directors — the people who actually carry the client relationships.
収益の仕組み
Almost all revenue is transaction fees. Advisory fees are largely earned when a deal actually closes — announcement retainers exist but the bulk of the money arrives at completion — so a mandate that dies leaves the work unpaid. Underwriting fees come from equity and debt offerings the firm helps place; commissions come from agency equity trading and from research subscriptions. Only the small Investment Management segment earns the recurring kind of income, a percentage fee on assets under management, which stood at $15.5 billion at the end of 2025. In 2025 advisory fees were $3,267.1 million of $3,855.8 million of total net revenues, with underwriting fees of $179.6 million, commissions and related revenue of $242.7 million, asset management and administration fees of $87.4 million and other revenue of $79.0 million.
セグメント別売上高
Strategic advice on mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, restructurings and shareholder matters, plus underwriting, private placements, agency equity trading and equity research sold to corporations, boards, financial sponsors and institutional investors.
Wealth management and fiduciary services for high-net-worth families through Evercore Wealth Management and Evercore Trust Company, plus minority interests in other asset managers; $15.5 billion of assets under management at year-end 2025.
競争優位性(moat)
ブランド · 狭いWhat Evercore sells is trust in a name and in a few dozen individual bankers. The independent-advisor positioning — no lending, no proprietary trading, therefore no conflict — is a genuine reason boards call the firm for the largest and most sensitive transactions, and a reputation of that kind takes decades to build. But it is a thin moat: the assets walk out of the building every evening, competitors bid for those same bankers with large packages, and the 10-K itself flags both the dependence on senior professionals and the growing legal difficulty of enforcing restrictive covenants. There are no switching costs — every mandate is won again from scratch.
需要を左右する要因
景気循環型Demand is the M&A cycle itself, and that cycle swings hard. Boards buy companies when financing is cheap and available, when valuations feel settled enough to agree a price, and when confidence is high; all three disappear together in a downturn, and fee income can fall by a third or more with almost no warning. The restructuring practice is the one counterweight — it gets busy precisely when advisory work on acquisitions dries up — but it is far too small to offset the swing. Evercore's own 2025 was the up-leg of that cycle: net revenues rose 29% to a record, with adjusted advisory fees up 34%.
主なリスク
- Difficult market conditions can cut revenue quickly — The company discloses that downturns, tighter credit and geopolitical shocks reduce both the number and the size of transactions, and that the timing of M&A activity is outside its control.
- Dependence on senior professionals — Revenue rests on a limited group of senior bankers, analysts and portfolio managers. Competitors offer attractive packages, departures can take client relationships with them, and enforcing restrictive covenants is becoming harder in several states.
- Fees depend on deals actually closing — Advisory revenue is largely contingent on completion. A transaction can fail because financing disappears, regulators object, a board says no or markets turn — and the work already done goes unpaid.
- Largely fixed cost base — Occupancy, technology and administrative expenses do not fall with revenue, so a weaker year compresses profitability, and expansion into new markets requires spending before it produces anything.
- Growth strains operations and compliance — Rapid expansion pressures operational, legal and compliance systems, and the company says it must keep investing in technology and people without assurance that those systems will scale.
- Competition in the equities business — The equities operation competes with universal banks and specialist firms that have greater resources and broader product ranges.
顧客集中度
The 10-K does not disclose any customer concentration figure, and Evercore does not identify a client that accounts for a material share of revenue. The economically relevant concentration is different in kind: fees are episodic and lumpy, and a handful of very large mandates can account for a disproportionate part of a given year's advisory revenue — the company attributed much of 2025's increase to revenue earned from large transactions. That is transaction concentration, not client concentration, and the filing puts no number on it.
強気材料
Buyers argue that the independent advisory model keeps taking share from universal banks, because a firm with no lending relationship and no trading book can sit on the sensitive side of a board's table without explaining a conflict. They point to a business that needs almost no capital and carries no credit risk, so cash converts to dividends and buybacks rather than to a balance sheet; to the record 2025, when net revenues rose 29% and Evercore advised on five of the fifteen largest announced transactions of the year; and to a hiring machine that keeps adding Senior Managing Directors, each of whom is expected to pay for himself or herself over a full cycle. In their reading, the firm is buying talent cheaply in weak years and harvesting it in strong ones.
弱気材料
Sellers fear that a record year is the wrong place to extrapolate from. Advisory fees arrive only when deals close, the cost base is largely fixed, and compensation is the dominant expense — so in a downturn revenue falls faster than costs and margins fall faster still, while the firm still has to pay to keep bankers it cannot afford to lose. They note that the whole franchise walks out the door every evening: the company itself lists dependence on senior professionals as a risk and says restrictive covenants are getting harder to enforce, and a departing team can take client relationships with it. They also see the concentration of a single business line — 98% of revenue from Investment Banking & Equities in 2025, with the Investment Management arm too small to steady anything — and no switching costs anywhere in the model, since each mandate must be won again from the start against Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and every other independent boutique.
Generated on 2026年9月18日 with claude-haiku-4-5 — shared with all users
Direct competitors
Who this company fights with for the same customers
Generated on 2026年9月18日 with claude-haiku-4-5 — shared with all users
Houlihan Lokey competes for the same independent advisory work, dominating mid-market M&A and restructuring mandates that Evercore also pursues, plus fairness opinions for the same boards.
Lazard is the other large listed independent advisory house, selling the same conflict-free M&A, restructuring and sovereign advice to big corporate and government clients on both sides of the Atlantic.
PJT Partners competes for the same advisory mandates, above all in restructuring and liability management, where it and Evercore are routinely on opposite sides of the same creditor or debtor table.
Moelis chases the same fee pool of independent M&A and restructuring mandates and names Evercore as a competitor in its own annual report.
Centerview is the private boutique that most often sits opposite Evercore on the largest US board-level merger assignments, competing for the same handful of mega-deal mandates.
Perella Weinberg sells the same senior, independent M&A and restructuring advice to large corporate clients in the US and Europe, and is named by Evercore among its direct rivals.
貸借対照表と流動性
売上高
$4.74B
直近12か月(2026/6/30まで)
純利益
$745M
直近12か月(2026/6/30まで)
フリーキャッシュフロー
$1.18B
自己資本合計
$2.03B
負債合計
$3.04B
流動比率
2.47
利払い倍率
-
負債/EBITDA
-
一株当たり利益(EPS)
売上高と純利益
フリーキャッシュフロー
収益内訳
財務推移表
利益率の推移
負債の推移
負債の重さ
成長率グリッド
成長率 — 売上高
適正価値の推定
適正価値
$302.82
現在株価
$262.73
安全マージン
+13.2%
適正価値レンジ
$199.75 - $405.90
使用した評価手法間のばらつきであり、統計的に較正された信頼区間ではありません。
推定方法
バリュエーション指標
P/E レシオ
14.61
ROE
29.1%
P/B レシオ
5.36
P/FCF
6.13
粗利益率
-
ROIC
-
収益性レーダー
価値創造(経済的モート)
ROIC
-
WACC
11.7%
ROIC − WACC
-
ファンダメンタル分析基準
合格(18)
- EPS shows upward trend
- Price CAGR 15.14%
- P/FCF 6.13
- Debt/Equity ratio
- Positive Free Cash Flow
- CapEx intensity
- Current Ratio
- Return on Tangible Assets
- Low reliance on intangibles
- ROE 39.8%
- Revenue Growth 5Y 11.2%
- Analyst Consensus 60% Buy
- Earnings Surprise avg 20.6%
- PEG Ratio 1.20
- Earnings Quality (OCF/NI) 2.24
- Share Dilution 1.1%
- Net Margin Trend 15.7% vs 14.2%
- Piotroski F-Score 5/9
不合格(3)
- P/B Ratio 5.36
- Price below Graham Number
- DCF valuation (Unknown)
データなし(6)
- ROIC NaN%
- Gross Margin NaN%
- Dividend Payout NaN%
- Operating Margin NaN%
- Interest Coverage
- Debt/EBITDA
Piotroski F-スコア
まちまちのシグナル:一部の領域に注意が必要
利益の質
高品質:利益はキャッシュに裏付けられている
株式希薄化
株式数は安定している
機関投資家の保有
ガバナンス
経営陣
| 氏名 | 役職 | 年齢 |
|---|---|---|
| Mr. Roger Charles Altman | Founder & Senior Chairman | 79 |
| Mr. John S. Weinberg | Chairman & CEO | 68 |
| Mr. Timothy Gilbert LaLonde M.B.A., M.Sc. | Senior MD & CFO | 63 |
| Mr. Jason Klurfeld J.D. | Senior MD, Corporate Secretary & General Counsel | 52 |
| Mr. Matthew Lindsey-Clark | Co-Head of EMEA Investment Banking, Global Adv. Europe & Sr. MD of Strategic Advisory of London | 62 |
| Mr. Paul Pensa CPA | Senior Managing Director, Chief Accounting Officer & Controller | - |
| Mr. David Kamo | Senior MD of Strategic Advisory of New York & Senior MD in Investment Banking | - |
| Mr. Sandeep Saini | Senior MD & Chief Information Officer | - |
| Ms. Katy Haber | Senior MD, Head of Investor Relations & ESG | - |
| Ms. Jamie Easton | Senior MD, Head of Communications & External Affairs | 46 |
監査リスク
7
取締役会リスク
5
報酬リスク
7
株主権利リスク
6
パート2 · 株価と買い時
この部分は企業に価値があるかを判断するものではありません。ファンダメンタルズに納得したうえで、いつ買うかを選ぶためのものです。内容:テクニカル分析、ポテンシャル、過去のドローダウン、ガンマエクスポージャー。
業績推移
via SEC EDGAR
Latest News
Recent headlines for EVR, sourced from Markets Gazette.
- 8d agoPOSITIVEPerché questa società di storage è salita del 13% ed è stata la migliore dell'S&P 500
Evercore Inc. shares surged 13% on Thursday, making it the top performer in the S&P 500. This significant gain follows its inclusion in the S&P 500 earlier this month and comes as investors assess the company's long-term growth prospects. Evercore reaffirmed its revenue guidance for fiscal year 2027 at $5.03-$5.07 billion, representing 37%-38% year-over-year growth. Furthermore, preliminary targets for fiscal year 2028 exceeded analyst consensus, indicating strong future performance expectations. The company also anticipates a non-GAAP operating income of $940-$960 million. This positive outlook and strong guidance are likely to attract further investor interest.
via Markets Gazette