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DR Horton Inc (DHI)

Valor Justo
Consumer CyclicalResidential ConstructionUnited States

Fundamental

76

Preço

$136.65

Capitalização de Mercado

$39.00B

Parte 1 · Quanto vale a empresa

Visão Geral

D.R. Horton is the largest homebuilder in the United States measured by homes closed. In fiscal 2025 (year ended September 30, 2025) it closed 84,863 homes at an average price of about $370,400, operating through 92 homebuilding divisions in 126 markets across 36 states. Almost all land development and construction work is performed by subcontractors; D.R. Horton buys or options the land, designs the product, manages the build and sells the finished home. Around the core homebuilding business it runs three adjacent operations: a rental segment that builds single-family and multi-family communities and sells them as income-producing assets, a 62%-owned publicly traded lot developer (Forestar) that supplies finished lots, and a financial services arm (DHI Mortgage plus title and insurance agencies) that finances and closes the homes it sells.

Como gera receita

Revenue is recognized almost entirely at closing, when a finished home is delivered to the buyer. Homes are sold from model homes by commissioned in-house salespeople and by independent brokers; the buyer puts down earnest money and contracts typically contain a financing contingency, with one to three months between signing and closing. The gross margin on home sales was 21.5% in fiscal 2025 against 23.5% the year before. Rental revenue is lumpy and comes from selling completed single-family and multi-family rental communities rather than from collecting rent. Financial services earns origination and title fees: DHI Mortgage originated or brokered 68,982 loans in fiscal 2025, mostly agency-eligible, and sells substantially all loans and the related servicing rights to third parties shortly after origination rather than holding them. Forestar sells developed lots, 83% of them to D.R. Horton itself, so that revenue is largely eliminated on consolidation.

Receita por segmento

Homebuildingquota não divulgada

Builds and sells single-family homes, mostly entry-level and first move-up, to individual buyers across 126 US markets. The filing states this is the core business and generated 92% of consolidated revenues; segment revenues were about $31.5 billion in fiscal 2025.

Rentalquota não divulgada

Develops single-family rental communities and multi-family apartment properties and sells the completed communities to investors and rental operators. In fiscal 2025 it closed 3,460 single-family rental homes and 2,947 multi-family units, for about $1.6 billion of segment revenue.

Forestar (lot development)quota não divulgada

A separately listed residential lot developer, 62% owned and consolidated, that buys raw land, entitles and develops it and sells finished lots to homebuilders. It sold 14,240 lots in fiscal 2025, 83% of them to D.R. Horton, so most of its roughly $1.7 billion of revenue is intersegment and eliminated in the consolidated figure.

Financial servicesquota não divulgada

DHI Mortgage originates mortgages for buyers of D.R. Horton homes and sells them on, alongside title agency and insurance agency services. Segment revenue was about $0.8 billion in fiscal 2025.

Vantagem competitiva

Vantagem de custo · Estreita

Homebuilding is a commoditised, locally competitive business: D.R. Horton itself says it competes on price, location, quality and design against local, regional and national builders and against the existing-home market. What it has instead of a brand advantage is scale. It is the largest builder in the country by closings, which lets it negotiate materials and subcontractor pricing on a national as well as a local basis, spread overhead over far more units, and keep a lot pipeline through its 62% stake in Forestar rather than tying up capital in raw land. Its captive mortgage arm also lets it control the financing step and use rate buydowns as a selling tool. These are real cost and distribution advantages, but they do not stop competitors entering a local market, and none of them protects volumes when rates rise.

O que impulsiona a procura

Cíclico

Demand for new homes is one of the most rate-sensitive things in the economy. A buyer's decision is made on the monthly payment, so mortgage rates, employment and consumer confidence move volumes directly; when rates rise, builders either lose orders or pay to buy the rate down, which shows up as a lower gross margin rather than a lower order count. Fiscal 2025 is the illustration: consolidated revenues fell 7% to $34.3 billion, closings fell 5% and home sales gross margin fell from 23.5% to 21.5%, so pre-tax income dropped 25% to $4.7 billion on a much smaller revenue decline. The company skews to entry-level buyers, who are the most payment-constrained part of the market. Against the cycle sits a slower structural driver — household formation and a long shortfall of new construction — which is why the downturns in this industry tend to be sharp but not permanent.

Principais riscos

  • The business is cyclical — The company discloses that its homebuilding, rental and land development operations are cyclical and significantly affected by changes in economic, real estate and other conditions, which can adversely affect results.
  • Mortgage availability and interest rates — A disclosed risk factor covers reductions in mortgage financing provided by government agencies, changes in government financing programmes, a reduced ability to sell originated loans on attractive terms, and rising mortgage rates — any of which can cut buyers' ability to obtain financing.
  • Input cost inflation — The filing flags increases in the cost of land, labour, materials and services, and the possibility that the company cannot pass those increases on through higher selling prices.
  • Inventory write-downs — The company discloses that it may have to take significant write-downs or impairments on the carrying value of land and home inventories, which would hit reported results. It says it tries to limit this by controlling the level of inventory investment and by buying lots that are substantially ready to build on where it can.
  • Competition — A disclosed risk factor covers competition in the homebuilding and rental markets, which the company says can limit its ability to sell homes and rental properties at profitable prices. It competes for land, materials, skilled labour and financing as well as for buyers.
  • Cancellations of contracts in backlog — Because contracts are typically signed one to three months before closing and usually contain a financing contingency, the company discloses that cancellations of sales contracts in backlog can reduce revenue and profitability.
  • Mortgage repurchase obligations — DHI Mortgage sells substantially all the loans it originates, but the company discloses that increases in loan repurchase obligations and credit losses could hurt the financial services business and consolidated results.
  • Dependence on Forestar — The company discloses that its significant investment in Forestar, and its reliance on Forestar for lot supply, could hurt results if Forestar runs into operational or financial trouble.

Concentração de clientes

The filing does not disclose a customer concentration figure for the group, and the structure of the business makes one unlikely to be meaningful: homes are sold one at a time to tens of thousands of individual buyers — 84,863 closings in fiscal 2025 — across 126 markets, so no single customer is material. The one genuine concentration sits inside the group rather than outside it: Forestar sold 83% of its lots to D.R. Horton itself in fiscal 2025, which is an intersegment dependence, not an external customer risk. The rental segment is the exception in kind, since whole communities are sold to a small number of institutional buyers, but the filing does not quantify that.

Os argumentos a favor

Buyers argue that scale is the whole point: as the largest builder in the country by closings, D.R. Horton buys materials and subcontractor time on terms smaller builders cannot match, and spreads overhead across nearly 85,000 homes a year. They point to the asset-light land strategy — optioning lots and sourcing them through a separately financed, 62%-owned Forestar instead of warehousing raw land — as the thing that should make the next downturn less damaging than past homebuilding cycles, and to the captive mortgage arm, which sells its loans on rather than holding credit risk and gives the company a direct lever on affordability through rate buydowns. They note that even in a year when closings, margins and pre-tax income all fell, the company still earned $4.7 billion pre-tax and generated $3.4 billion of operating cash from homebuilding. And they lean on the structural argument: household formation against years of under-building, with the entry-level segment D.R. Horton dominates as the part of the market with the most unmet demand.

Os argumentos contra

Sellers fear that fiscal 2025 shows how the operating leverage works in reverse: revenue down 7%, closings down 5%, but pre-tax income down 25%, because holding volume in a high-rate market costs margin — home sales gross margin fell from 23.5% to 21.5%. They argue that the incentives and rate buydowns propping up demand are a direct transfer from the income statement, and that if rates stay high the choice is between shrinking volumes and thinner margins with no third option. They point to the concentration in entry-level buyers, the most payment-sensitive and least financially resilient cohort, and to the company's own disclosure that it may have to write down land and home inventories. They note that this is a business with no pricing power against local competitors or against the existing-home market, where a fall in mortgage rates would also release more used-home supply. And they remind buyers that the industry's peak earnings and peak margins have historically been the wrong moment to extrapolate.

Generated on 18 de setembro de 2026 with claude-haiku-4-5 — shared with all users

Direct competitors

Who this company fights with for the same customers

Compare

Generated on 18 de setembro de 2026 with claude-haiku-4-5 — shared with all users

P/E: 12.8Score: 58Market cap: —

The second-largest US homebuilder by closings, Lennar sells high-volume production homes to the same entry-level and first move-up buyers in the same Sun Belt and Southeastern markets, and like D.R. Horton bundles its own mortgage and title services into the sale.

P/E: 11.9Score: 83Market cap: $22.33B

Pulte builds across the same three buyer segments D.R. Horton serves — entry-level, move-up and active adult — in overlapping metropolitan markets, and competes for the same land positions and subcontractor capacity.

P/E: 16.0Score: 66Market cap: $16.70B

Through Ryan Homes and NVHomes, NVR sells affordable and move-up production homes to the same buyers in the Mid-Atlantic and Southeast, with a mortgage arm attached to the sale just as D.R. Horton has.

Meritage Homes CorporationMTH

Meritage concentrates on entry-level and first move-up homes in Texas, Arizona, Florida and the Carolinas — precisely the states where D.R. Horton's Express Homes brand sells the most.

KB HomeKBH

KB Home targets the same price-sensitive first-time buyer in California, Texas and the Southwest, and offers in-house financing through KBHS Home Loans, competing on monthly payment as much as on the house itself.

Taylor Morrison Home CorporationTMHC

Taylor Morrison sells entry-level, move-up and resort-lifestyle homes across Florida, Texas, Arizona and the Carolinas, overlapping with D.R. Horton's largest regions and also competing in build-to-rent communities.

Balanço & Liquidez

Receita

$33.35B

Últimos 12 meses (até 30/06/2026)

Resultado Líquido

$3.05B

Últimos 12 meses (até 30/06/2026)

Fluxo de Caixa Livre

$3.28B

Capital Próprio Total

$24.19B

Passivo Total

$10.73B

Rácio de Liquidez

4.66

Cobertura de Juros

-

Dívida/EBITDA

1.74

Resultados Por Ação

Receita & Resultado Líquido

Fluxo de Caixa Livre

Decomposição dos Resultados

Demonstração histórica

Margens ao longo do tempo

A dívida ao longo do tempo

Quanto pesa a dívida

Grelha do crescimento

Crescimento — Receitas

Estimativa de Valor Justo

CíclicaJustamente Valorizada

Valor Justo

$129.74

Preço Atual

$136.65

Margem de Segurança

-5.3%

Intervalo de Valor Justo

$100.54 - $158.95

Dispersão entre os métodos de avaliação utilizados, não um intervalo de confiança calibrado estatisticamente.

Métodos de Estimativa

Preço-alvo dos analistas:$158.92
Fluxo de caixa descontado (DCF):Não aplicável a este tipo de empresa
Multiplicador de lucros (P/E):$128.70
Fórmula de crescimento de Graham:Não aplicável a este tipo de empresa
Valor da capacidade de gerar lucro (EPV):$95.16
P/B justificado:Não aplicável a este tipo de empresa
Desconto de dividendos (Gordon):Não aplicável a este tipo de empresa
P/FFO, fundos de operações:Não aplicável a este tipo de empresa
Lucros de meio de ciclo:Dados insuficientes para o calcular
Multiplicador sobre as receitas:Não aplicável a este tipo de empresa
Consenso dos Analistas:Comprar (10B / 15H / 1S)
Última Surpresa de Resultados:+4.37%

Métricas de Avaliação

Rácio P/E

13.03

ROE

14.8%

Rácio P/B

1.60

P/FCF

11.94

Margem Bruta

22.6%

ROIC

-

Radar de Rentabilidade

Criação de Valor (Vantagem Competitiva)

ROIC

-

WACC

10.2%

ROIC − WACC

-

Critérios de Análise Fundamental

Aprovado (16)

  • EPS shows upward trend
  • Price CAGR 17.57%
  • P/FCF 11.94
  • P/B Ratio 1.60
  • Debt/Equity ratio
  • Positive Free Cash Flow
  • CapEx intensity
  • Debt/EBITDA
  • Return on Tangible Assets
  • Low reliance on intangibles
  • Price below Graham Number
  • ROE 12.8%
  • Revenue Growth 5Y 11.0%
  • PEG Ratio 1.03
  • Earnings Quality (OCF/NI) 1.10
  • Share Dilution -6.6%

Reprovado (6)

  • Gross Margin 22.6%
  • DCF valuation (Overvalued)
  • Analyst Consensus 38% Buy
  • Earnings Surprise avg 0.7%
  • Net Margin Trend 9.2% vs 11.5%
  • Piotroski F-Score 3/9

Indisponível (5)

  • ROIC NaN%
  • Dividend Payout NaN%
  • Operating Margin NaN%
  • Current Ratio
  • Interest Coverage

Piotroski F-Score

3/9

Preocupações financeiras graves

score
criteria

Qualidade dos Resultados

1.10

Alta qualidade: resultados respaldados por caixa

Diluição de Ações

-6.6%

A recomprar ações. Favorável ao acionista

Participações institucionais

Governação

Equipa Executiva

NomeCargoIdade
Mr. David V. AuldExecutive Chairman69
Mr. Paul J. RomanowskiPresident, CEO & Director54
Mr. Bill W. WheatExecutive VP & CFO59
Mr. Michael J. MurrayExecutive VP & COO59
Mr. Aron M. OdomSenior VP & Corporate Controller51
Collin Michael DawsonVice President of Corporate Finance & Treasurer-
Ms. Jessica Leigh HansenSenior VP of Communications & People and Head of Investor Relations-
Mr. Thomas B. MontanoSenior VP, Corporate Compliance Officer & Corporate Secretary-
Mr. Rick HortonPresident of South Region-
Matt FarrisPresident of West Region-

Risco de Auditoria

7

Risco do Conselho

6

Risco de Remuneração

5

Risco dos Direitos dos Acionistas

8

Parte 2 · O preço e o momento de entrar

Esta parte não serve para saber se a empresa vale: serve para escolher quando comprá-la, depois que os fundamentos te convenceram. Dentro: análise técnica, potencial, quedas históricas, exposição gama.

Documentos

  • Relatório anual (10-K)

    Uma visão anual do negócio, dos resultados financeiros e dos riscos da empresa.

    Arquivado em 2025-11-19

    Ver documento
  • Relatório trimestral (10-Q)

    Uma atualização sobre o desempenho financeiro dos últimos três meses.

    Arquivado em 2026-07-23

    Ver documento
  • Relatório de fato relevante (8-K)

    Um aviso sobre um fato relevante, como uma mudança na liderança ou um grande anúncio.

    Arquivado em 2026-09-15

    Ver documento

via SEC EDGAR

Histórico de Resultados

via SEC EDGAR

Latest News

Recent headlines for DHI, sourced from Markets Gazette.

  • 3d agoNEGATIVE
    Tassi ipotecari al 9%? Tre azioni che subiranno di più

    D.R. Horton Inc. (DHI) faces significant headwinds as chief economist Selma Hepp warns of a potential 9% mortgage rate scenario if inflation reaccelerates and US Treasury yields climb due to fiscal deficits. While not the base case, such extreme rates would severely cripple housing activity, exacerbate affordability issues, and freeze inventory as buyer demand plummets. As the largest US homebuilder by volume, D.R. Horton's stock is particularly vulnerable to a downturn in the housing market driven by elevated borrowing costs, potentially impacting sales and profitability.

via Markets Gazette